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ABSTRACT
This paper examines competition in e-markets by comparing price levels and price
dispersion in the on-line music market. The data consists of price information on CDs
pure-play Internet and hybrid firms in North American and European markets. The
sellers are divided in groups according to a geographical location, a brand valuation
and a variety of product offerings. We find that pure price levels are significantly
different between the North American and European sellers and between the sellers of
a wide product offering and a simple product offering. Branding does not seem to
allow for a price premium. Price dispersion exists in the market. Prices are more
dispersed among fringe sellers than branded sellers. 
The results indicate that the market is characterized by practices of imperfect
competition: collusion, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. Our tests show that
geographical location matters in e-markets, and a variety of product offerings can
create price premiums. The North American music market has a group of firms or a
single dominant firm, with whom most sellers are willing to match their prices. We
also suggest that the fringe sellers act as competitive monopolists. However, the pure-
play branded sellers are locked in oligopoly or they collude in pricing, whereas the
existence of physical retail channel influences pricing strategies employed by the
hybrid sellers. Therefore, the on-line music market proves that expectations of free
competition in on-line markets are not fulfilled.
 
31. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, the Internet became the symbol of the New Economy, which promised a
new era of innovative business practices accompanied by simultaneous high growth
and low inflation. At the core of this new economic reality were the dotcoms, a wide
array of firms targeting electronic business to consumer (B2C) markets. Stock
valuations indicated that high returns were expected from the investments in e-
commerce1. However, any business with connections to the New Economy saw its
shares plunge in 2000. One of the key reasons for this was that on-line business
environment is prone to make e-markets more competitive than conventional
markets.2 
The key difference between conventional and on-line business environment can be
found in the economics of information. Business environment in the physical world is
more or less trading in markets or inside hierarchies. Making transactions within these
structures involves costs because main actors are human beings with limited
capabilities to receive, send and process information. The Internet is the backbone of
on-line environment. It is a network of intelligent nodes, which are computers each
equipped with processing power. The structural form of the Internet is a hyperarchy.
As a result, distances between the nodes on the Internet are equal regardless of their
geographical locations. Since bandwidth and processing power grow in a rapid rate,
more and richer information can be processed and distributed at lower costs than it is
possible in conventional environment.3       
On-line business environment has powerful consequences on the factors determining
competition in e-markets. First, the value of a location diminishes because a
hyperarchy does not require physical movement between locations. Second, the
computers connected to the network can automatically search and process information
retrieved from other nodes at low costs. For these reasons, asymmetrical information
arising from search costs diminishes, as buyers can become aware of all the sellers in
                                                
1 I use the prefix “e-“ when referring to a word “electronic” in terms “business”, “commerce” and
“market”. The terms “on-line” and “electronic” will be used interchangeably when referring to markets
on the Internet.
2 For a general account on the Internet, the New Economy and their repercussions, the reader is
suggested to refer Castells (2001).
4a market and the prices they are charging. According to a study by Shankar (et al.
1999) consumers are more inclined to search lower prices in on-line markets than
conventional markets. The economic theory states that a seller’s supernormal profit
depends on the asymmetry of information on market conditions. At the extremes of
market structures, free competition and monopoly, information is symmetric (Salop &
Stiglitz 1977, p. 494). The market structures of imperfect competition (excluding
monopoly) which are oligopoly and monopolistic competition, are to some degree
creations of asymmetric information. Hence, e-markets should gravitate towards free
competition in general, but under some conditions monopolies might emerge. 
Harnessing the power of computers and networks is the source of a competitive
advantage in on-line markets. Low cost information search and processing capabilities
enable a dramatic decrease in menu costs (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000, p. 566). These
result from efforts sellers undergo when they change prices. They are believed to be
the source of price rigidity in conventional markets. A firm can apply computers in
rapid responses to changes in demand or competitors’ pricing decisions4. Moreover,
networking can be used to minimize inventories and enable modern production
methods such as just-in-time production and mass-customization. In the optimum
state, a retailer becomes an intermediary facilitating a trade between a manufacturer
and a consumer. The economy-wide introduction of e-markets could increase overall
market efficiency and create new lucrative markets for intermediation (Bakos 1997, p.
25). For these reasons, e-markets provide substantial rewards for the retailers who can
adapt to on-line environment by optimizing logistic connections and using the power
of networked computers as a strategic tool in competition. Consequently, factors
determining competition in e-markets may prove more complex than initially
assumed.
As the Internet retailing has become everyday business during the last decade, a few
empirical studies of competition in on-line markets has already emerged. These have
concentrated mostly on comparisons between on-line and conventional markets in
North America. The pioneer in this field was Bailey (1998) who compared prices of
                                                                                                                                           
3 Evans & Wurster (1997, p. 75).
4 Tang & Xing (2001) note that frequent rapid reactions may not be lucrative, because they increase the
possibility of a typing error. A firm can incur large expenses in errors of a digit or a decimal point.
5compact discs (CD) and books between conventional and on-line retailers. He
discovered that prices on the Internet were higher than in physical channels.
Considering the impacts the Internet was expected to have on competition, this was
clearly a surprising outcome. Bailey suggested that the novelty of  on-line markets
explains the result. So far, this seems to have been the right explanation. Brynjolfsson
& Smith (2000) conducted a similar study, in which they discovered that prices on-
line were lower than in conventional markets. Furthermore, Smith & Brynjolfsson
(2001) examined book sales on the Internet. They found that branded retailers are able
to set price premiums over their unbranded rivals. Ancarani & Shankar (2002) have
compared prices in conventional and electronic markets in Europe. Their results
included that price levels on-line were slightly lower than off-line. However, adding
delivery costs in the prices reversed the situation. Finally, Tang & Xing (2001)
discovered that multi-channel retailers have higher price levels than their pure-play
on-line counterparts.
The purpose of this paper is to study competition in e-markets. To achieve this goal,
we have selected the on-line music market to be the subject of the study. We intend to
answer the following research questions on the basis of data, which consists of price
information on CDs. Does branding enable a price premium? Does international
competition exist on the Internet? What effects a variety of product offerings has on
competition? What can we deduce about the market structures by examining price
dispersion? Which market structures are suitable to describe competition on the
Internet? 
This study builds on previous research. The paper proceeds in a following order: the
methodology and the data will be described in the second section. After this, we will
carry out various statistical tests on the data and analyze the results5. These take place
in sections three and four. In the final section, we will draw conclusions from these
results.
                                                                                                                                           
62. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Commercialization of the Internet began in the mid-1990s as real world business
models were transferred to on-line environment. Products of the recording industry
were among the first to be sold on the Internet. The pioneer of on-line record stores
was CDNow, which started operating in 1994. It was the market leader until
Amazon.com branched out to sell music in 19986. Following these two, numerous “e-
tailers” have entered the market since. For this reason, the online music market is an
excellent subject to research competition in e-markets. 
The data in this study consists of price information on compact discs (CDs). CDs are
ideal products to research competitive pricing because they are quasi-commodities (de
Figueiredo 2000, p. 42). Music albums are clearly differentiated from each other,
which means that every CD-title is differentiated from each other. However, retailers
cannot further differentiate them. Since contents of a CD can be easily distributed
over the Internet, the consumer is often able to sample a product before she decides to
purchase it. This should diminish the seller’s profit marginal because the buyer is able
to experience the good before the purchase, which reduces the asymmetry of
information in the trade.
The data was gathered by using the evenbetter.com-shopbot 7. Evenbetter.com
specializes in comparing prices in three product categories: books, movies and music.
The advantage arising from the use of a shopbot is the possibility to observe all visible
costs associated with the electronic B2C-commerce. These include a retail price, taxes
and duties levied on a product and delivery costs. In contrast, the invisible costs a
buyer incurs, such as search costs, remain hidden8. Due to consumer heterogeneity,
these costs are highly individual by their characteristics (Stigler 1961, p. 216). Should
they be measured and included, the analysis would become very different. Hence, the
price information is used in two ways. First, a “pure price” is a price, which does not
                                                                                                                                           
5 Mathematical descriptions of the statistical tests employed in this study can be found in Appendix 2.
6 In 2002, Bertelsmann AG, which owns CDNow, handed over most of the operations of CDNow to its
rival Amazon.com (International Herald Tribune Online 2002). 
7 In 2000, Bertelsmann AG, the owner of evenbetter.com, sold her to a rival comparison shopping
service DealTime (internetnews.com 2000).
8 For example, these could include opportunity costs for time and costs from a computer and an access
to the Internet. 
7include any extra costs such as taxes or delivery fees. It reveals the seller’s mark-up in
pricing with respect to other sellers. Second, a “total price” is a price, which includes
all the visible costs facing the customer. It includes the prices set by a retailer and a
delivery service and taxes levied by the government.     
Representative items were selected from the popular music category. The assumption
behind this is that the supply of popular music is larger than more marginal music
such as classical music 9. In consequence, competition among the sellers of popular
music is more active. To capture the on-line sales element, 20 representative titles
were selected from the official US sales chart Billboard Hot 200 and Billboard’s Top
Internet Sales Chart. Each item was noted on both charts at the time the observations
started. The retailers included in the study were pure-play on-line sellers and hybrid
sellers that were listed by evenbetter.com10. By this method, 8064 price quotes from
the titles were observed from a sample of 32 on-line retailers11. These were made once
a week during a period of 26 weeks from the beginning of July 2000 until the end of
December 2000. 
In order to discover elements that influence price competition in e-markets, the
selected sellers were aggregated into groups according to their characteristics to find a
general price level of a group12. The most fundamental characteristic was geography.
Since the Internet is expected to broaden markets beyond national boundaries and
create a global electronic market place, we test international price competition by
comparing geographical groups. The sellers were located in the USA, Canada, the UK
and Germany. The first two countries form the single NAFTA-market and the latter
two belong to the common EU-market. Subscripts for the geographical groups are
“NA” denoting North American firms and “EU” denoting European firms. 
                                                
9 Tang & Xing (2001) support this assumption. They found that competition on price is more active
with more popular titles than random titles in the market for DVDs.
10 A pure-play on-line seller is a retailer, which operates only on the Internet. A hybrid seller is a
retailer, which has a physical store chain in the conventional market and an on-line business outlet on
the Internet.
11 All price quotes were obtained in the US dollars (USD). The shopbot automatically converted price
quotes in other currencies to the USD with a current exchange rate. 
12 The table presenting these characteristics can be found in Appendix 1.
8Since the North American firms are more numerous, they are further divided in
groups with respect to branding and product variation to verify their impacts on
competition in the market. A brand is considered a strategic tool, which can be used to
increase sales and set a price premium. Tuominen (1995) describes brand equity as a
combination of a name, customer loyalty, perceived quality, mental associations and
possible other value factors. Since it is difficult to imitate, copy, or resell a brand, it
can provide a permanent competitive advantage. As implemented in Brynjolfsson &
Smith (2000), we consider the firms attracting most web traffic as measured by
web21.com more visible13. Since attracting web traffic requires efforts similar to
branding, these are assumed to have a high brand valuation among buyers14. Due to
the short history of B2C-markets on the Internet, the on-line firms have not had time
to build trust between them and consumers (Kotha & Rindova 1999, p. 4). In addition
to this, the exchange of confidential information, such as a credit card number,
between a buyer and a seller accentuates the importance of branding in e-commerce.
Branding was also considered to be higher among hybrid sellers than other sellers
(Smith et al. 1999, p. 13). The hybrid firms can leverage trust earned in conventional
markets to on-line markets. A subscript “B” denotes the branded sellers. Fringe sellers
are considered to be the retailers that do not meet either of these criteria. A subscript
“F” denotes the fringe sellers. 
Diversity of a product offering can be a way to utilize the economics of scale and
scope in e-commerce. The on-line trading system is a source of the economies of
scope because the seller’s web site has no physical limitations (Curry & Kenney 2001,
p. 8-9, 22). As a result, an e-tailer does not incur significant costs in adding more
tradable items in its catalogue (Bakos 2001, p. 4). This also reduces the risk arising
from changes in demand, as the seller is less dependent on the demand for single
product category. In addition to this, electronic processing of orders leads to minimal
inventories and increased efficiency. According to Bakos (1991), “endless shelf
space” creates significant economies of scale. Buyers can usually save in delivery
costs by purchasing several goods from the same seller or pooling several orders into
one. This could be an important factor in competition because Smith & Brynjolffson
                                                
13 Web21.com is a service, which tracks web traffic using the hits on a web site as a measure of the
site’s popularity.
9(2001) discovered that consumers are more sensitive to changes in delivery costs than
changes in an item price. The division concerning product offerings is made
depending on how close substitutes the products the firm sells are. The retailers
selling music, movies and books are considered to have a simple product offering15. A
subscript “S” denotes this group in the tables and an abbreviation “SPO-sellers” in the
text. In contrast, the retailers selling products from different categories (e.g. music and
electronics) are considered to have a wide product offering. This group is denoted by
a subscript “W” in the tables and an abbreviation “WPO-sellers” in the text. 
The data set has some limitations that will have an effect in results. First, it does not
reveal the market share of an individual firm. Second, it does not tell us exact web
traffic an individual firm’s web site attracts. For these reasons, it is not possible to
give a certain view over competitive dynamics on the Internet. With these limitations
in mind, we will run statistical tests on the data in the next section.
3. PRICE LEVELS
In this section, we will analyze general pure and total price levels in the on-line music
market. For this reason, retailers are aggregated into groups that represent a seller
type. Comparisons are made between the groups of North American and European
sellers, branded and fringe sellers, and SPO- and WPO-sellers. Since most firms offer
multiple delivery options that vary in duration and cost, the one with the lowest price
was selected to represent the total price. 
The first statistical test implemented on the data is the Jarque-Bera test for
normality16. The purpose of this test is to find whether the distribution underlying the
data is normal. “JB” denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic in the tables. The critical
value of a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom and a 5 percent probability of
error is used to determine normality. The test hypothesis is that the distributions are
normal. We test the distributions measured with pure and total price levels. The
                                                                                                                                           
14 As a proxy for popularity, the branded sellers accounted for over 90 % of all the links leading to the
North American seller’s web sites included in the study. 
15 CDs, DVDs and books are considered to be relatively close substitutes because they are based on
information, used mostly for entertainment, and within the same pricing range.
16 The calculations involved in determining the Jarque-Bera test statistic can be found in Appendix 2.
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results from the JB-tests can be found in Table A1 in Appendix 1. The results indicate
that the observations are not normally distributed. Removing an outlier observation
from the group of branded sellers makes the distribution normal but this does not
change the general conclusion of non-normality17. 
Since the Jarque-Bera test leads to a rejection of the normality hypothesis in every
potential comparison pair, we use a non-parametric test to discover statistically
significant differences in price levels. The test carried out on the data is Mann-
Whitney’s U-test, which is a non-parametric alternative to the parametric t-test18. In
the tables, “U” denotes a calculated test statistic, “Md” denotes median values, and
“p” denotes a probability for acceptance of the test hypothesis. Critical p-values
below 0.05 reject the test hypothesis. Subscripts “pure” and “total” refer to a price
type that is used in the test hypothesis.
The first test is conducted between branded and fringe sellers. The U-test determines,
whether a statistically significant difference in median price levels exists. The test
hypothesis is that median price levels between the groups are equal. The results from
tests with pure and total price levels are presented in Table 1. The p-value suggests
that the test hypothesis of equal median pure price levels should be accepted.
Removing the outlier does not change this result. The test is then carried out by
comparing total median price levels. These are also equal with a high probability. As
before, the result holds when the outlier is removed. In conclusion, we accept the test
hypothesis of equal price levels. The results indicate that the branded sellers, in
general, do not have an advantage in pricing over the fringe sellers, and branding does
not seem to allow for a price premium.
The impact of the Internet on international competition is analyzed by comparing
price levels between the North American and European retailers. The results from the
U-test with pure and total price levels are shown in Table 2. We reject the test
hypothesis of equal pure price levels. The median price level in Europe is
                                                
17 An “outlier” is a statistical term for an anomalous observation, which is located far from the rest of
the data. Among the branded sellers, BMG USA can be treated as such. Its price level was considerably
lower than the price levels of other sellers in the group. In addition to this, BMG USA produces music
and sells only its own titles.
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considerably higher than in North America. This result is strengthened by the fact that
current exchange rates at the time were favorable for the European sellers19. The
result obtained earlier holds also with total price levels, as we reject the test
hypothesis with a very high probability. It seems that especially in global markets,
extra costs arising from taxes, duties and delivery expenses have a great impact on
total prices. This sample suggests that expectations of fiercer price competition on the
Internet are not fulfilled. The pure price levels alone show that there is a great divide
between the trading blocks. In addition to this, the mandatory extra costs increase the
difference even wider.
Table 1. The U-test: branded and fringe sellers.
Hypothesis MdB MdF U p Conclusion
Brandedpure = Fringepure 13.65 14.01 -1.83 0.067 accepted
Branded*pure = Fringepure 13.72 14.01 -1.23 0.219 accepted
Brandedtotal = Fringetotal 17.54 17.50 -0.55 0.582 accepted
Branded*total = Fringetotal 17.48 17.50 -0.58 0.562 accepted
Branded* calculated by excluding BMG USA.
Table 2. The U-test: European and North American sellers.
Hypothesis MdEU MdNA U p Conclusion
EUpure = NAFTApure 18.15 13.88 -2.43 0.015 rejected
EUtotal = NAFTAtotal 26.87 17.54 -3.07 0.002 rejected
The on-line trading system creates significant economies of scale and scope. A seller
can capitalize these by diversifying its product offering at low costs. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that a seller of a wide product offering can use this to set price
premiums on items. Anecdotal evidence on a viability of this strategy exists. The
largest on-line retailer in the world, Amazon.com, started with selling books on-line,
but it has gradually expanded its product offering and become linked to its suppliers.
As a result, Amazon.com has become an on-line market place for a wide variety of
products and services. 
                                                                                                                                           
18 The calculations involved in determining the Mann-Whitney test statistic can be found in Appendix 2
and the numbers of observations in Table A1 in Appendix 1.
19 During the observation period, the average exchange rates were 0.88903 USD/EUR and 1.46419
USD/GBP, whereas during three following years these were 0.990174 USD/EUR and 1.52711
USD/GBP.
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The hypothesis presented above is tested by dividing the North American sellers in
two categories according to the variety of their product offering. The test hypothesis is
that pure price levels are equal. The results from the U-test are presented in Table 3.
The test hypothesis can be rejected with high confidence. The result indicates that the
WPO-sellers are able to set a price premium over the SPO-sellers. After this, the same
test is carried out by examining total price levels. The results from the U-test are
shown in Table 3. According to the test, we reject the hypothesis of equal price levels.
As all the visible costs are included, the price levels between the groups differ
significantly. An explanation for this could be that consumers are likely to save in
delivery costs by pooling order. As a result, the WPO-sellers have a higher mark-up
per item, which leads to larger profits. To compete with them, the SPO-sellers have to
accept a lower mark-up per item.
Table 3. The U-test: SPO-sellers and WPO-sellers.
Hypothesis MdSPO MdWPO U p Conclusion
SPOpure = WPOpure 13.88 13.85 -3.25 0.001 rejected
SPOtotal = WPOtotal 17.36 17.86 -3.07 0.002 rejected
Dividing the sellers in groups and comparing their price levels indicated that the price
levels are not equal in every aspect. By employing statistical methods, we have seen
that they are equal only between the branded and fringe retailers. This would imply
that an investment in branding does not necessarily lead to a higher profit marginal.
The outcome is contradictory to the results achieved by Smith & Brynjolfsson (2001).
They analyzed consumer behavior at the shopbots by using a data set, which was
gathered from book sales by Evenbetter.com-shopbot. The data consisted of prices, a
number of searches per title and cookies, which revealed the buyer’s location and her
choice over the sellers 20. As a result, the study showed that the branded sellers could
set an average price premium of 1.13 USD per item over the sellers of low brand
valuation. Consequently, they found out that consumer loyalty to the seller enables an
average price premium of 2.49 USD per item over an unknown seller. 
                                                
20 A cookie is a text file, which a web server can store on a user’s hard drive. The web site can store
and retrieve information on the user’s computer by using cookies.
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The explanation for these seemingly contradictory results could lie in the differences
of the data sets and methodology. CDs and books, nevertheless, share the
characteristics of a quasi-homogenous product based on information. Therefore, the
missing price premium could result from several factors present in the on-line music
market as opposed to most other on-line markets. First, a CD is a product with a
relatively low price unlike products such as electronic appliances. As a consequence,
consumers place lower valuations on warranties, return policies or a seller’s
reputation, which are typically characteristics attached to a brand (Tuominen 1995, p.
16). Second, competition in this particular market could be more intense. Third, the
buyer population has a higher propensity to search the lowest price than in other on-
line markets. Bae (2003) suggests that a lower than expected market price results from
varying demands among the buyers. Some consumers abstain from searching the
lowest price because search costs exceed their individual consumer surplus. A
decrease in the market price increases the overall number of buyers in the market. For
this reason, sellers in the market collusively set prices below the equilibrium, which
benefits the buyers and sellers alike.
The comparison between the North American and European sellers shows that
geography still matters on the Internet. Price levels in Europe were considerably
higher with and without all visible extra costs. There are two plausible explanations
for this. First, it could be that the North American retailers, in general, are more cost
efficient than their European rivals are. As a consequence, they are able to supply
items at lower prices than the European retailers are. Second, it is likely that
competition in the North American market is more intense than in Europe, which in
turn leads to the lower prices. The fact that there are more incumbent firms in the
North American market than in the European market supports this argument. 
In the third test, the sellers were divided in groups according to variety of product
offerings. The results indicate that the retailers with a wide product offering are able
to set a price premium over the retailers who offer less product variety. With both
pure and total price levels, the WPO-sellers have a higher median price level than the
SPO-sellers. We can draw two conclusions from this. First, utilizing the economies of
scope enables a price premium because a wide product variety is a way to use
efficiently the advantages offered by the on-line trading system. Second, consumers
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could select a WPO-seller in order to save in delivery costs by pooling orders across
product categories. These two factors are a likely explanation for the observed price
premium in this category. 
4. PRICE DISPERSION
The existence of price dispersion indicates that one or more conditions of competitive
markets are not met. It can be a consequence from various reasons. Stigler (1961)
accounts price dispersion for “ignorance in the market”, which is a result of
asymmetrical information, product heterogeneity and search costs. Basically, there are
two kinds of price dispersion. Spatial price dispersion is a range of prices charged in
different locations. Temporal price dispersion is a range of prices charged in a time
interval. 
There are several theoretical models that illustrate the emergence of price dispersion.
Salop & Stiglitz (1977) present a model of spatial price dispersion. In this model,
price dispersion is a result from entry costs or heterogeneous search costs among the
buyer population. The informed buyers select the lowest price in the market, whereas
the uninformed buyers shop at random. The sellers are monopolistically competitive
and set their prices accordingly. There are two prices in the equilibrium: a price of
perfect competition for the informed buyers and a price which is above a monopoly
price for the uninformed buyers. Varian (1980) presents a model of temporal price
dispersion with similar assumptions regarding buyers, sellers and market conditions.
As in Salop & Stiglitz, two prices prevail in the equilibrium. 
Considering the assumptions behind these models, price dispersion should not exist in
on-line markets. There are two major reasons for this. First, buyers face low search
costs on the Internet. The search process can be automatized and no spatial movement
is required. For instance, the buyers using a shopbot become fully informed with
negligible search costs on the price level of a market. Second, entry costs incurred by
buyers are low. Thanks to the Internet, the technology needed for on-line transactions
is essentially identical among the buyer population. In reality, however, price
15
dispersion exists in e-markets and it can even be higher than in conventional
markets21. 
There are several explanations for the emergence of price dispersion in electronic
markets. According to Smith (et al. 1999), there are six major factors involved. First,
product heterogeneity through differentiation is an obvious reason for a range of
prices. Second, individually distributed opportunity costs for time may lead to the
existence of price dispersion. It is also likely that customer awareness in on-line
markets, “the neural estate”, could create price premiums. Large investments in
marketing and highly visible locations at popular web sites support this view.
Branding could be another cause because it is a way to signal trust to consumers.
Switching costs can be also utilized to lock a customer in a service and consequently
raise the price. Finally, price discrimination creates price dispersion. This can take
place as in conventional markets. For instance, discounts are offered to selected
customers. Another way is to exploit the benefits of on-line trading systems, and use
the information on customers in dynamic pricing purposes. 
Smith (2001) provides a model of price dispersion for e-markets. He suggests that
buyers in e-markets incur different search costs in respect to their mental awareness of
sellers. He divides the buyers in three categories. Dominant aware buyers can search
without costs for prices among dominant sellers, but finding additional sellers creates
search costs. Fringe aware buyers have no search costs among the dominant sellers
and one fringe seller, but additional searches are costly. Buyers in the third category
use a shopbot and face no search costs in the market. As a result, the dominant sellers
collude by setting prices low enough to discourage consumers from searching lower
prices. The more numerous fringe sellers, however, randomize their prices in an
equilibrium, in which the prices are constrained by the pricing decisions of the
dominant sellers.
The data in this study consists of quasi-homogenous products. This eliminates product
differentiation as a device of price discrimination. As a result, the information
affecting the trade becomes symmetrical between buyers and sellers. As we recall the
                                                
21 See, for example, Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000).
16
earlier results, the overall price levels were not equal between the North American
and European sellers and the WPO- and SPO-sellers. Price dispersion is obviously
inherent in these results. In contrast, price levels between the groups of branded and
fringe sellers were equal. However, price ranges, standard deviations (denoted by “S”)
and coefficients of variation (denoted by ”VC”) of the groups in Table 4 suggest that
there is heterogeneity in price levels within the groups and in the market. Therefore,
we examine firm-specific data to make more precise inferences about market
conditions than it was possible with aggregated data. To do that, we will employ
statistical methods to discover how prices are dispersed in the market and within the
groups.
Table 4. Price Ranges.
Pure Price Ranges
Group Mean Min. Max. S VC
Branded 13.14 7.99 16.03 2.56 0.195
Fringe 14.18 9.36 18.54 2.53 0.178
EU 16.43 13.54 18.30 1.54 0.094
NAFTA 13.79 7.99 18.54 2.56 0.186
SPO 13.47 7.99 18.54 2.95 0.219
WPO 14.44 12.59 17.08 1.50 0.104
Total Price Ranges
Group Mean Min. Max. S VC
Branded 16.87 11.66 19.85 2.56 0.152
Fringe 17.46 12.68 20.47 2.53 0.145
EU 28.13 22.35 38.42 1.54 0.055
NAFTA 17.24 11.66 20.47 2.56 0.148
SPO 16.85 11.66 20.47 2.95 0.175
WPO 18.02 16.53 20.22 1.50 0.083
The differences within the groups are examined by carrying out the one factor
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the data. First, we test whether or not the
observations in the groups are from the normal distribution. This is accomplished by
examining skewness of data, and comparing calculated values from the data to a
corresponding critical value of the normal distribution22. The results are presented in
Table A2 in Appendix 1, where “zpure” and “ztotal” denote calculated absolute values
from pure and total price levels. These values are compared to the critical value 1.96
in the normal distribution, which corresponds to a 5 percent margin of error. The tests
                                                
22 The calculations involved in determining the normality test statistic “z” can be found in Appendix 2.
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prove that most sellers do not meet the normality assumption required by the
parametric ANOVA.
Since the normality assumption is not valid, we apply a non-parametric ANOVA on
the data. This is also known as the Kruskal-Wallis test23. The test hypothesis is that all
medians from pure and total price levels are equal. These are denoted by “P1, 2, …” in
Table 5. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is statistically different
from the others. The calculated test statistics are compared to significant values of a
χ2-statistic with a 5 percent margin of error. The results from the groups are presented
in Table 5. The test hypothesis of equal median pure and total price levels among the
sellers in the market is rejected. Furthermore, the breakdown of the market in the sub-
categories of fringe and branded sellers leads to a rejection of the test hypothesis
within these groups as well.
Table 5. The Kruskal-Wallis test: seller groups.
Group Hypothesis χ2calc χ20.95 Conclusion
Marketpure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P24 260.29 35.17 rejected
Fringepure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P15 159.17 23.68 rejected
Brandedpure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P9 82.72 15.51 rejected
Markettotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P24 261.48 35.17 rejected
Fringetotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P15 160.73 23.68 rejected
Brandedtotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P9 80.25 15.51 rejected
By calculating figures from price dispersion we can study conditions in the market.
These are presented in Table 6. Regardless of a price level used in measurement, the
share of sellers charging prices above the market mean or median is high because
nearly a half of the seller population sets prices above the market average. This is
consistent with Varian’s (1980) model. It predicts that prices above the market
average are more frequent because they are a safer bet for the sellers. The breakdown
between fringe and branded sellers shows that higher prices are more frequent among
the fringe sellers. The difference between the mean and median shares is negligible.
Consequently, average price dispersion is higher among them. However, among the
branded sellers the percentage of firms above the market mean is considerably larger
than above the market median. There is also less average price dispersion among them
                                                
23 The calculations involved in performing the Kruskal-Wallis test can be found in Appendix 2, the
numbers of observations in Table A2 in Appendix 1.
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in pure price levels, but total price levels seem to equalize. These figures suggest that
the branded sellers are more sensitive to each other’s pricing decisions than the fringe
sellers are.
Table 6. Price dispersion figures.
Pure Price Levels
Group Share of sellers above the
market mean / median
Average price
dispersion
Market 58 % / 42 % 14 % 
Branded 21 % /  8  % 12 % 
Fringe 37 % / 34 % 15 % 
Total Price Levels
Group Share of sellers above the
market mean / median
Average price
dispersion
Market 58 % / 46 % 13 % 
Branded  21% / 13 % 13 % 
Fringe 37 % / 33 % 12 % 
Multiple comparisons are a method, which is used to enhance the results from the
variance analysis24. In this case, we use it to examine, which seller pairs are
statistically significantly different from each other. The results from the multiple
comparisons on pure price levels among the sellers in the market are presented in
Table A3 in Appendix 1. The share of statistically significant pairs is 30 percent. The
same test is carried out on total price levels in Table A4 in Appendix 1. This does not
alter the overall situation because the share reduces only slightly to 28 percent. These
results indicate that most sellers in the market take into account their competitors’
pricing decisions. 
A closer examination of how the pairs are distributed among sellers reveals the
pricing behavior of an individual firm vis-à-vis other firms. The results on pure and
total price levels are presented in Table 7. The implication behind these figures is that
the less significant pairs a seller has, the more other sellers are willing to match prices
with it. Since fringe sellers are too small to act as price leaders, dominant firms in the
market are the branded sellers with few significant pairs. The nucleus in this group
consists of the firms with less than a 10 percent share. In contrast, prices are more
                                                
24 The calculations used to carry out multiple comparisons can be found in Appendix 2.
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dispersed among the fringe sellers, where firms above the 10 percent threshold form a
vast majority. Examining total price levels do not reverse the result as changes in
shares upward and downward roughly cancel each other out. However, among the
branded sellers only one firm, Amazon.com, remains below the 10 percent share. An
implication of this is that other firms use its prices as a benchmark for their pricing
decisions. This conduct fits in the framework laid out in Stackelberg’s model of
oligopolistic competition.  
Table 7. Distribution of significant pairs: the market.
Pure Price Levels:
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
% 8.3 37.5 16.7 45.8 8.3 12.5 8.3 58.3 20.8
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS
% 20.8 25.0 16.7 20.8 20.8 33.3 4.2 54.2 41.7
Seller MM PC QM SR SG Spn
% 41.7 8.3 12.5 41.7 33.3 33.3
Total Price Levels:
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
% 8.3 33.3 20.8 33.3 12.5 12.5 12.5 45.8 20.8
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS
% 12.5 37.5 20.8 20.8 16.7 20.8 4.2 41.6 33.3
Seller MM PC QM SR SG Spn
% 54.2 54.2 25.0 33.3 37.5 41.7
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals.
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
To examine more closely price dispersion within the groups of fringe and branded
sellers, we conduct multiple comparisons on both groups. The results from the
multiple comparisons on pure and total price levels among the fringe sellers are
presented in Table 8. In this group, pure price levels were statistically different in 33
percent of the comparison pairs. Measured with total price levels, the share of
statistically significant pairs decreases to 31 percent of the total. The firm-specific
distributions of significant pairs are presented in Table 9. They indicate that including
extra costs in prices seems to reduce price dispersion within the group because the
shares of significant pairs decrease with total prices. 
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Table 8. Price dispersion: fringe sellers.
Pure Price Levels
AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn
800 - - - - - - - - + + - + - -
AC - - - + - - - + + - + - -
Buy - - - - + + - - - - + -
CDW - - - - - + + - + - -
DW - - - - + + - + - -
Elg - + + - - - - + -
Exp + - - + - - - -
Fie - + + + + - -
MS + + + + - -
MM - - - + +
PC - - + +




AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn
800 - - - - - - - - + + - - - -
AC - - - + - - - + + + + - -
Buy - - - - + + - - - - - +
CDW - - - - - + + - + - -
DW - - - - + + - - - -
Elg - + - - - - - - +
Exp - - + + - - - -
Fie - - + + + - -
MS + + + + - -
MM - - - + +
PC - - + +
QM - - +
SR - +
SG -
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant.
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant. 
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
The results from the multiple comparisons show that there is price dispersion among
the fringe sellers. This is a strong argument against the conditions of free competition
or oligopolistic competition. The best model to describe competition among the fringe
sellers is the general model of monopolistic competition. The fringe sellers could be
applying pricing strategies, which exploit the asymmetrically informed buyers, reach
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the informed customers through price competition or target special segments of the
market.
Table 9. Distribution of significant pairs: fringe sellers.
Pure Price Levels
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie
% 20.0 26.7 20.0 20.0 20.0 26.7 13.3 46.7
Seller MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn
% 40.0 53.3 60.0 13.3 53.3 33.3 20.0
Total Price Levels
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie
% 13.3 33.3 20.0 20.0 13.3 20.0 13.3 33.3
Seller MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn
% 33.3 53.3 60.0 26.7 33.3 13.3 40.0
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals.
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
In a similar vein, the test is conducted on the group of branded sellers. The results are
presented in Table 10. The share of statistically significant pairs is 31 percent with
pure price levels. When the test is carried out on pure price levels, however, the share
increases to 39 percent. The firm-specific distributions of significant pairs are
presented in Table 11. They show that extra costs, which are added in prices at an on-
line store, increase price dispersion. Despite this, the evidence reveals that most firms
want to match their total prices, not pure prices, with the market leader. 
These results reveal the existence of price dispersion among the branded sellers. Price
dispersion among them seems to be higher than among the fringe sellers. As a
consequence, the conditions of free competition are not met. However, we can make
some deductions about the pricing strategies applied by the group. The statistically
significant pairs are mainly hybrid sellers and the outlier, whereas other branded
sellers do not have significant differences between their price levels. The matching
prices set by other branded sellers could be interpreted as evidence of oligopolistic
price competition. However, since their price levels are not the lowest in the market, it
could constitute evidence of collusive pricing. Since prices become more dispersed
with total price levels, it is possible that some firms have cost advantages in delivery
cost. These could result from better contracts with logistics service providers. 
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Table 10. Price dispersion: branded sellers.
Pure Price Levels
B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
Amaz + - + - - - + -
B&N + + - - + + -
Blue - - - - - -
BMG + + - - +
Bord - - - -




B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
Amaz + - - - - - - -
B&N - + - - + + -
Blue + - - + + -
BMG + + - - +
Bord - - + -
CDN - + -
CDU - +
Dja +
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant. 
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant. 
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
Table 11. Distribution of significant pairs: branded sellers.
Pure Price Levels
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja Tow
% 33.3 55.6 11.1 55.6 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 22.2
Total Price Levels
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja Tow
% 11.1 44.4 33.3 55.6 22.2 22.2 33.3 55.6 33.3
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals.
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
The existence of a physical store chain can explain the pricing strategies employed by
the hybrid sellers. The reason for this is that it creates a higher cost structure for them,
which in turn leads to higher prices. Another cause could be that the hybrid sellers are
obliged to match prices between their physical outlets and online stores to avoid
cannibalizing their own business (Deleersnyder et al. 2002, p. 337-338). Tang & Xing
(2001) suggest that the explanation could lie in two consumer types. The first type
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compares prices and buys from the cheapest seller, which are typically pure-play on-
line retailers. The second type is less inclined to buy from pure-play sellers because he
or she lacks trust for them or is not aware of their existence. As a result, hybrid sellers
can leverage trust earned in conventional markets to premium pricing in e-markets.
The results from the internal differences among the groups of branded and fringe
sellers are consistent with results from other studies. Compared to conventional
markets, price dispersion seems to be equal (Bailey 1998) or higher (Brynjolfsson &
Smith 2000) on-line. Ancarani & Shankar (2002) discovered that price dispersion is
higher when measured with range among pure-play sellers but in terms of variability,
hybrid sellers have higher price dispersion. In addition to this, the hybrid sellers had
higher price levels than either pure-play on-line or conventional sellers. Tang & Xing
(2001) examined price dispersion between the hybrid and pure-play retailers of
DVDs. They found that price dispersion is sharply lower among the pure-plays than
the hybrids. Smith (2001) investigated price dispersion among pure-play Internet
bookstores. His findings included that dominant sellers are able to collude, whereas
fringe sellers cannot do this. Moreover, some fringe sellers follow price setting of the
dominant sellers, whereas others create their own pricing strategies.
In conclusion, the existence of price dispersion can be interpreted as a sign of
imperfect competition or low search costs. Salop & Stiglitz (1977) support the first
approach. According to them, a sufficiently large number of informed buyers create
an externality leading to a perfectly competitive price. For this reason, it seems that
the buyers who search the lowest price are in the minority, whereas most buyers
cannot reap maximum benefits from e-markets. Since sellers cannot differentiate their
products and buyers face low search costs, some factors favor imperfect competition.
These could be high search costs for some buyers, unawareness of the range of sellers
in the market, or issues, such as branding. Alone or combined, they make the market
less competitive, and we find evidence supporting oligopoly, collusion and
monopolistic competition in the on-line music market. Rothschild (1974) offers the
alternative view. He shows that increased price dispersion is a product of lower search
costs. From this aspect, lower search costs allow a buyer to search across a wider




This paper approaches competition in electronic B2C-markets by examining price
competition in the on-line music market. While most researchers have concentrated
on comparing conventional and on-line markets, our approach is to study purely the
market on the Internet. In order to do that, we have to understand the special
characteristics of on-line business environment and what are their impacts on
competition.
The key difference to conventional business environment can be found in the
economics of information. It is a result from lower costs in information processing
and distribution. They lead to lowered search costs. As a result, buyers can become
aware of all sellers, products and prices in the market. Electronic commerce can also
broaden markets and lower entry costs. These factors could intensify price
competition and benefit consumers. To succeed in e-business, sellers have to
understand computer networks and harness their power. On-line trading systems can
create significant economies of scale and scope. However, B2C-markets on the
Internet are a recent phenomenon and for this reason, methods such as branding can
be an important tool in a corporate strategy.
We examine competition in the on-line music market by using price data from CDs.
The study includes 32 pure-play on-line and hybrid retailers from the North American
and European markets. We test the impacts of the geographical location, branding and
a variety of product offerings on price levels. Testing with pure price levels shows
that a brand does not allow for a price premium. In contrast, a wide product offering
seems to lead to a price premium. The geographical location matters on the Internet
because the European sellers have significantly higher price levels than their North
American rivals. Testing with total price levels reveals that there is no statistical
difference between the branded and fringe sellers. The premium found in pure price
levels in favor of the sellers of a wide product offering exists also with total price
levels. Likewise, the difference between the European and North American sellers
remains the same.
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The existence of price dispersion can be evidence of imperfect competition. Price
dispersion exists in the North American market. Majority of sellers set prices above
the market mean. However, the share of branded sellers above the market median is
significantly lower than above the mean. This suggests that sellers in the group are
willing to match prices. By examining the results from multiple comparisons on
sellers in the market, we make deductions about competition and pricing strategies.
They indicate that there is a small group of firms or a single firm acting as a
Stackelberg leader among the branded sellers, with whom other firms match their
prices. Moreover, prices are more dispersed among fringe sellers. A closer study of
the internal differences among the groups of fringe and branded sellers reveals that the
pure-play branded sellers form an oligopoly or collude in pricing. We also find that
the hybrid sellers, in general, do not follow this suit. The fringe sellers, on the other
hand, behave as a general model of monopolistic competition predicts. 
In conclusion, the on-line music market proves that expectations of more competitive
e-markets are not realized. From the customer’s point of view, these findings imply
that evidence of imperfect competition can be found in the market, which should be
highly competitive due to the product characteristics. This is clearly leading to
deterioration of consumer welfare. From the firm’s aspect, we find that investments in
branding do not necessarily pay off. However, investments in broader on-line trading
may prove profitable. In the future, advances in enabling technologies of e-commerce
will have further impacts on business environment in on-line markets. Without a
doubt, these will influence competition and market structures in e-markets. For this
reason, more research will be needed to assess the overall impacts of e-markets on
competition, the economy and social welfare.   
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APPENDIX 1
SELLER DESCRIPTIONS: Abbreviations, Branding, Types and Locations.
Firm: Abbreviation Location Branding Type
800.com 800 NAFTA Fringe WPO
AlphaCraze.com AC NAFTA Fringe SPO
Amazon.com Amaz NAFTA Branded WPO
Amazon.de - EU - -
BarnesAndNoble.com B&N NAFTA Branded (H*) WPO
Bluelight.com Blue NAFTA Branded (H) WPO
BMG USA BMG NAFTA Branded SPO
Borders.com Bord NAFTA Branded (H) WPO
Bol.de - EU - -
Buecher.de - EU - -
Buy.com Buy NAFTA Fringe WPO
CDNow.com CDN NAFTA Branded SPO
CDUniverse.com CDU NAFTA Branded SPO
CDWorld.com CDW NAFTA Fringe SPO
Davista.co.uk - EU - -
Djangos.com Dja NAFTA Branded (H) SPO
DrWax.com DW NAFTA Fringe SPO
Elgrande.com Elg NAFTA Fringe WPO
Express.com Exp NAFTA Fringe SPO
Fiera.com Fie NAFTA Fringe WPO
JPC.de - EU - -
MusicSelection.com MS NAFTA Fringe SPO
MyMusic.com MM NAFTA Fringe SPO
Playcentric.com PC NAFTA Fringe SPO
QuickMusic.com QM NAFTA Fringe SPO
SamTheMusicman.com SR NAFTA Fringe SPO
SaulGoodman.com SG NAFTA Fringe SPO
Spun.com Spn NAFTA Fringe SPO
TheInternetBookShop.co.uk - EU - -
TowerRecords.com TR NAFTA Branded (H) SPO
UK.bol.com - EU - -
WHSmithOnLine.co.uk - EU - -
*(H) denotes a hybrid seller.
Table A1. The Jarque-Bera test for normality.
Pure Price Levels
Group Observations Skewness Kurtosis JB χ20,95 Conclusion
Branded 162 0.02263 2.00584 6.69 5.99 reject
Fringe 256 0.70246 1.93652 33.12 5.99 reject
Branded* 156 0.23913 2.85739 1.62 5.99 accept
EU 104 3.13993 18.0608 1153,81 5.99 reject
NAFTA 418 0.58392 2.21678 34.44 5.99 reject
SPO 268 0.70896 1.71266 40.96 5.99 reject
WPO 150 1.02037 1.55877 39.01 5.99 reject
Total Price Levels
Group Observations Skewness Kurtosis JB χ20,95 Conclusion
Branded 162 0.40869 4.68878 24.05 5.99 reject
Fringe 256 0.55925 2.75824 14.08 5.99 reject
Branded* 156 0.53362 5.94019 64.00 5.99 reject
EU 104 1.33827 3.03972 29.86 5.99 reject
NAFTA 418 0.48628 3.54854 21.92 5.99 reject
SPO 268 0.64401 2.59823 20.63 5.99 reject
WPO 150 1.03547 2.26219 30.21 5.99 reject
Branded* calculated by excluding BMG USA.
Table A2. Normality test for sellers.
Seller Observations |zpure| < 1.96 Conclusion |ztotal| < 1.96 Conclusion
800 20 5.78 rejected 5.23 rejected
AC 20 6.28 rejected 6.20 rejected
Buy 20 5.31 rejected 6.08 rejected
CDW 20 6.63 rejected 6.84 rejected
DW 11 1.94 accepted 1.95 accepted
Elg 19 1.48 accepted 1.76 accepted
Exp 16 3.96 rejected 3.71 rejected
Fie 18 0.05 rejected 2.70 accepted
MS 17 0.44 accepted 0.50 accepted
MM 19 5.60 rejected 7.64 rejected
PC 15 2.67 rejected 2.42 rejected
QM 20 6.27 rejected 6.17 rejected
SR 17 4.36 rejected 5.63 rejected
SG 9 1.93 accepted 0.46 accepted
Spn 20 6.55 rejected 6.83 rejected
Amaz 19 2.42 rejected 2.18 rejected
B&N 20 5.68 rejected 5.54 rejected
Blue 20 6.11 rejected 6.11 rejected
BMG 6 3.35 rejected 2.86 rejected
Bord 19 3.10 rejected 2.80 rejected
CDN 20 4.38 rejected 4.74 rejected
CDU 20 5.22 rejected 5.34 rejected
Dja 20 2.49 rejected 3.97 rejected
TR 18 4.45 rejected 4.72 rejected
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
Table A3. Price dispersion: the market (pure price levels)
AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
800 - - - - - - - - + + - + - - - - - + - - - + -
AC - - - + - - - + + - + - - - - - + - - - + -
Buy - - - - + + - - - - + - - + - - - - - - -
CDW - - - - - + + - + - - - - - + - - - + -
DW - - - - + + - + - - - - - + - - - + -
Elg - + + - - - - + + - + - + - - - + -
Exp + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fie - + + + + - - + - + + - + + + -
MS + + + + - - - - + + - - + + -
MM - - - + + - + - - - - - - +
PC - - + + - + - - + + - - +
QM - - - - + - - - - - - -
SR + + - + - - - - - - +
SG - - - + + - - - + -
Spn - - - + - - - + -
Amaz - - - - - - + -
B&N + + - - - + -
Blue - - - - - -
BMG - - - - +
Bord - - + -
CDN - + -
CDU - -
Dja +
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant. 
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant. 
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
Table A4. Price dispersion: the market (total price levels)
AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
800 - - - - - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - - + -
AC + - - + - - - + + + + - - - - - + - - + + -
Buy - - - - + + - - - - - + - + - - - - - - -
CDW - - - - - + + - + - - - - - + - - - + -
DW - - - - + + - - - - - - - + - - - + -
Elg - + + - - - - - + - + - - -- - - - -
Exp - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + -
Fie - + + + + - - + - - + - - + + -
MS + + + + - - - - - + - - - + -
MM - - - + + - + + - + + - - +
PC - - + + - + + - + + - - +
QM - - + - + - - - - - - -
SR - + - + + - - - - - +
SG - - - - - - - - + -
Spn + - - + - - + + -
Amaz - - - - - - - -
B&N - + - - - + -
Blue - + - - + -
BMG - - - - +
Bord - - + -
CDN - + -
CDU - -
Dja +
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant. 
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant. 
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1.
APPENDIX 2
THE JARQUE-BERA TEST FOR NORMALITY
The first steps in carrying out the Jarque-Bera test for normality are to cal-














where xi is an observation i from a sample, x is the sample mean and σ is the











(xi − x)2, (4)











which has asymptotically a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom.
THE MANN-WHITNEY U-TEST
The Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test to examine if two samples
have the same median. To derive the test statistic u, the statistics u1,2 from
samples 1 and 2 are calculated:








where n1and n2 are the sizes of the samples 1 and 2. R1and R2 are the rank
sums, which are obtained by ranking the data and summing the ordinals belong-
ing to each group. The test statistic u becomes the smaller value from u1and
u2. With large samples, the test statistic u approaches the normal distribution







n1n2(n1 + n2 + 1)
12
. (9)






Coefficient of variation V C is calculated by dividing a sample standard de-






A simple method for testing whether a group of observations is normally dis-
tributed is to examine its skewness. To perform the test, a standard error of






where n is the number of observations. The test statistic z has a normal distri-





in which S is skewness defined in (2).
THE KRUSKAL-WALLIS ONE-FACTOR ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE
The Kruskal-Wallis test for ANOVA is a generalization of Mann-Whitney’s U-
test. The purpose is to examine the location of a distribution in several groups.
The first step in performing the test is to replace the original observations yij
from 1, 2, ..., k groups, where k ≥ 3, with ranks calculated from the entire data.
After this, the sum of ranks Ri and the mean of ranks Ri = Rini from each group










− 3(n+ 1), (14)
where n is the number of all observations. The test statistic H approximates a
χ2-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom.
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS
Multiple comparisons are calculated by using the results obtained in the one-
way analysis of variance. The difference between groups i and j is defined to be
statistically significant if












where zα/k(k−1) is α/k(k−1)-fractile of the normal distribution, n is the number
of all observations, and ni and nj are the numbers of observations in groups i
and j.
